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In this paper, we analyze the effects of multi-homing consumers on content 
provision by media firms. We develop a model where media firms compete on 
content provision and advertising revenues, and consumers enjoy network 
effects from consuming content that other consumers also consume. Media 
firms have to choose if they are single-content or multi-content, and in the 
latter case how much content to offer. Competition for advertising revenues 
gives a two-sided market nature to our model, since advertisers prefer media 
firms with more demand. As such, media firms would like to increase demand 
to increase advertising revenues. Offering more content increases demand 
because more consumers can consume their ideal variety without paying 
transport costs. We show that, relatively to the case with single-homing 
consumers, media firms provide less content with multi-homing consumers. 
The reason is that with multi-homing consumers, competition between media 
firms is weakened. Multi-homing consumers consume from all media firms, 
and therefore media firms have lower incentives to provide content to attract 
demand, and advertising revenues. As a result, social welfare tends to be higher 
under the multi-homing case relatively to the single-homing case, when the 
advertising market is large, and when the network effects are large relative to 
the intensity of consumers’ preferences.
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Abstract
We analyze the e¤ects of multi-homing consumers on content pro-
vision by media rms. We develop a model where media rms com-
pete on content provision and advertising revenues, and consumers
enjoy network e¤ects from consuming content that other consumers
also consume. Media rms have to choose if they are single-content
or multi-content, and in the latter case how much content to o¤er.
Competition for advertising revenues gives a two-sided market nature
to our model, since advertisers prefer media rms with more demand.
As such, media rms would like to increase demand to increase ad-
vertising revenues. O¤ering more content increases demand because
more consumers can consume their ideal variety without paying trans-
port costs. We show that, relatively to the case with single-home
consumers, media rms provide less content with multi-homing con-
sumers. The reason is that with multi-homing consumers, competition
between media rms is weakened. Multi-homing consumers consume
from all media rms, and therefore media rms have lower incentives
to provide content to attract demand, and advertising revenues. As a
result, social welfare tends to be higher under the multi-homing case
relatively to the single-homing case, when the advertising market is
large, and when the network e¤ects are large relative to the intensity
of consumerspreferences.
Keywords: Content Provision; Two-Sided Markets; Multi-Homing.
JEL Classication: D43, L13, L82, L86.
Centre for Applied Research at NHH (SNF), Norwegian School of Economics (NHH),
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1 Introduction
One of the main concerns for media regulators is the diversity of content
provided by media rms. A media market with a diverse provision of content
is seen to contribute to consumer welfare because from one side it satises
consumersdiverse preferences, and from the other side it can contribute to
a better function market economy and democracy, since consumers can be
more informed (see Coase, 1974; Hayek, 1945; and Mill, 1859). A diverse
media market is however not a guarantee of well-informed consumers, since
as argued by Downs (1957), it can be rational for consumers to not incur
in the costs to acquire information1. Accordingly, when the costs to acquire
information are very high, and the impact that an informed consumer can
have on economic and political outcomes is small, then, it might be optimal
from an individual point of view to not search for information2.
In this paper, we do not analyze consumersincentives to acquire infor-
mation, we focus instead on the impact that informed consumers can have
on media rmsincentives to provide content. Imagine that a share of con-
sumers likes to be informed, and are therefore willing to search for informa-
tion from di¤erent media outlets. What are the e¤ects of these informed
consumers on media rms choice regarding content provision? Is it that
informed consumers increase or decrease media rmsincentives to provide
a more diversied content in the media market?
The literature in media economics usually assumes that consumers have
a strong preference for a given variety and therefore they only consume from
one media rm. This is a direct consequence of the workhorse model of
media economics, the Hotelling model (Hotelling, 1929). However, as noted
by Caillaud and Jullien (2003) and Rochet and Tirole (2003), consumers are
seldom single-homing consumers. Rather consumers are very often multi-
homing consumers in that they consume from di¤erent media outlets.
In this paper, we adopt the modeling strategy of multi-homing consumers
of Doganoglu and Wright (2006, 2010)3. In addition to this, our model has
1See also Becker (1983, 1985), Coate and Morris (1995), Downs (1957), Feddersen and
Pesendorfer (1997), Martinelli (2006), Wittman (1989).
2According to this view, uniformed consumers can have a negative impact on political
and economic choices. For empirical evidence, see for instance Eisensee and Strömberg
(2007), Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1997), Prat and Strömberg (2005, 2011), Rothbauer
and Sieg (2013), Snyder and Strömberg (2010), Strömberg, D. (2001, 2004a, 2004b, 2007,
2008).
3Doganoglu and Wright (2006, 2010) analyze the e¤ects of multi-homing on compat-
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two more blocks. The rst block considers a two-sided market, in the sense
that media rms derive revenues from advertising (see for instance Rochet
and Tirole, 2003; Anderson and Coate, 2005; Peitz and Valletti, 2008; von
Ehrlich and Greiner, 2013; and Kind et al., 2007). Advertisers prefer media
rms that have more consumers, and therefore media rms would like to
attract more demand to increase advertising revenues.
The second block takes into account that media rms can choose to follow
a single-content or a multi-content strategy. With a single-content strategy,
media rms only provide one type of content (a point in the Hotelling line).
With a multi-content strategy, media rms provide di¤erent types of content
(a segment in the line), and therefore they have to decide on the diversity of
content o¤ered.
The diversity of content that is available in a media market is a central
question in media economics. However, to the best of our knowledge, this
issue has only been studied in the context of single-content rms and single-
homing consumers. When media rms are single-content, the question that
arises is if the media market will o¤er minimum di¤erentiation (just one type
of content) or maximum di¤erentiation (two type of contents). On this ap-
proach, see for instance Gabszewicz et al. (2001, 2002). Garcia Pires (2013,
2014) departs from the limitations of single-content media rms and consid-
ers the case with multi-content media rms. Garcia Pires (2013, 2014) shows
that the interaction of multi-content media rms with two-sided markets
carries some implications that have been previously ignored. O¤ering more
content increases demand because more consumers can consume their ideal
variety of content without paying transport costs. As such, in a two-sided
market, the question is not only about minimum versus maximum di¤eren-
tiation but also about the level of content o¤ered. However, Garcia Pires
(2013, 2014) analyzes only the case of single-homing consumers.
In this paper, we merge multi-homing consumers, with multi-content me-
dia rms in a two-sided market. In this set up, we show that relatively to
the case with single-homing consumers, media rms provide less content with
multi-homing consumers. The reason is that with multi-homing consumers,
competition between media rms is weakened. Multi-homing consumers con-
sume from all media rms, and therefore media rms have lower incentives
ibility and exclusive dealing, respectively. In turn, Choi (2010) considers the case of
multi-homing from the side of content providers in the Internet. Carrillo and Tan (2006)
analyze multi-homing from both the side of consumers and content providers.
3
SNF Working Paper No 08/15
to provide content to attract demand, and advertising revenues. As a result,
social welfare tends to be higher under the multi-homing case relatively to
the single-homing case, when the advertising market is large, and when the
network e¤ects are large relative to the intensity of consumerspreferences.
Our results have as such some implications not only for media markets
but also for the discussion on rational ignorance. As discussed above, to
have consumers that are not willing to incur costs to be informed can have
negative consequences on political outcomes. However, to have consumers
that are willing to incur in the costs to acquire information, because they
derive some extra benets from being informed, like network and information
benets, can in turn be detrimental to the diversity of content that nds voice
in media markets.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we
present the base model. In section 3, we analyze the case of single-homing.
In section 4, we look at the multi-homing case. In section 5, we discuss the
main ndings.
2 Model
The model in this paper is based in the Hotelling competition model (Hotelling,
1929). To this model, we add advertising (like in Anderson and Coate, 2005,
and Peitz and Valletti, 2008), multi-content media rms (like in Garcia Pires,
2013, 2014), and multi-homing consumers (like in Doganoglu and Wright,
2006, 2010).
The media sector is made up of two media rms, media rm 1 and media
rm 2. The media rms provide content, for instance information and news,
to the media market. Consumers can subscribe to media rm 1, to media rm
2 (single-homing) or to both (multi-homing). As in Doganoglu and Wright
(2006, 2010) consuming content from a media rm give extra benets, N ,
like network and information e¤ects, where N is the number of consumers in
the media market. In terms of network and information e¤ects, we can think
for instance that a consumer can extract benets from interacting with other
consumers that also consume the same type of content, or that information
has a value in social, economic, and political interactions. We assume that
the media market has two type of consumers according to their marginal
valuation of the extra benets, which are denoted as b. A share 0 <  < 1 of
consumers give a high valuation to these extra benets, and have b = bH . A
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share 1  of consumers give a low valuation to these extra benets, and have
b = bL, with bH > bL > 0. Following our discussion on rational ignorance,
we can think of the high type consumers, as consumers that are willing to
incur in the costs to acquire information.
Consumers are uniformly distributed on a line of length one, [0; 1], and
they have heterogeneous preferences in the Hotelling manner. The line rep-
resents consumerspreferences, and the mass of consumers is normalized to
one.
Like in Doganoglu and Wright (2006, 2010), media rm 1 is located at
point 0 in the Hotelling line and media rm 2 is located at point 1. We
x locations because the aim of the paper is not the choice of location in
the product space, but rather the choice of the diversity of content. In the
discussion section of the paper, we discuss the implications of rms choosing
also location in the Hotelling line.
In what concerns content, we allow media rms to provide more than just
one type of content. In other words, contrary to standard Hotelling models,
media rms are not limited to be located in just a point in the line (single-
content strategy). Like in Garcia Pires (2013, 2014), media rms can choose
to cover a line segment (multi-content strategy), where the size of the line
segment is indicated by 0 < di < 1.
When deciding between the single-content strategy (a point in the line)
and the multi-content strategy (a line segment), a media rm weights the
costs and the benets of these two strategies. The benets of a multi-content
strategy are to increase demand, given that consumers do not have to incur
transport costs to consume their ideal-content. The costs of a multi-content
strategy are to incur in extra costs to cover more than one point in the line.
These costs equal:
Ci =
d2i
2
; i = 1; 2, (1)
where  is a parameter that captures the technological costs to follow
a multi-strategy strategy. In this way, to model multi-content media rms,
we follow the approach by Alexandrov (2008) to "fat products." With fat
products, a rm o¤ers just one product that contains a set of characteristics
amongst which consumers can select at no extra cost. An example of a fat
product is a software program where consumers can choose between di¤erent
applications. In other words, fat products are dened as access products:
when consumers access a given product, they can pick up amongst what
5
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is o¤ered "inside" the product. In the context of the media market, "fat
content" refers to the case where a media outlet caters to di¤erent preferences
by providing di¤erent content, for instance on its website, and consumers can
decide what to consume from this set of content o¤erings.4
In addition, we assume that a media rm can only follow a multi-content
strategy that is contiguous to their location in the line, i.e. for media rm 1,
the multi-content choice has to be contiguous to the point 0; and for media
rm 2 the multi-content choice has to be contiguous to point 1. One reason
for this to occur can be due to diseconomies of scope. For instance, a media
rm when moves content contiguously along the line, it only needs to incur in
the costs expressed in equation 1. However, if a media rm provides content
discontinuously along the line, it has to incur in extra sunk cost for each
new location and associated multi-content segment. This sunk cost might be
tough to be prohibitive5.
The utility of a consumer of type b located outside the multi-content
segments of the two media rms, when the consumer only consumes from
media rm i (single-homing) is:
U(x; b;Ni) = v   ti (x; di) + bNi, (2)
where v is the intrinsic value of consuming content from media rm i,
t represents the intensity of consumerspreferences (transport costs in the
Hotelling terminology), and di stands for the amount of content supplied by
media rm i. We assume that v is su¢ ciently high so that the media market
is cover, i.e. all consumers consume content from at least one media rm.
4Dewan et al. (2003) have a similar set-up to Alexandrov (2008). The di¤erence is
that Dewan et al. (2003) model product customization. Customization and fat products
are related but not identical concepts. With customization, a rm adapts a standard
product and transforms it into several customized products. A customized product can
be acquired at an additional price to that of the standard product. An example of a
customized product is a personal computer, where consumers can choose between di¤erent
components at di¤erent prices. Then, under customization, and contrary to fat products,
price discrimination is central. In the case of the internet media market, it seems more
appropriate to think in terms of fat products than of customization, since for instance,
an internet website is always just one product and price discrimination, in spite of some
attempts, is not the standard business practice in the industry.
5For example, a media rm to provide content away from its location, it might need to
hire a complete new sta¤ and respective administrative structure that specializes in this
di¤erent content area. Conversely, when a media rm provides content contiguous to its
location in the line, it might be able to continue to use the same sta¤ and structure.
6
SNF Working Paper No 08/15
In addition, t1 (x; d1) = t (x  d1) and t2 (x; d2) = t (1  x  d2). Also, if a
consumer is located inside the multi-content segment of a media rm, his/her
utility simplies to U(x; b;Ni) = v+ bNi, since he/she does not need to incur
transport costs to consume his/her preferred variety of content.
In turn, the utility of a consumer of type b located outside the multi-
content segments of the two media rms, when he/she consumes from both
media rms (multi-homing) is:
U(x; b;N) = v   t1 (x; d1)  t2 (x; d2) + bN . (3)
Since N = 1 and  t1 (x; d1)   t2 (x; d2) =  t (x  d1)   t (1  x  d2),
we have that U(x; b;N) = v   t ((1  d1   d2)) + b. Again, if a consumer
is located inside the multi-content segment of a media rm, his/her utility
simplies to U(x; b;Ni) = v + bN , given that he/she does not need to incur
transport costs to consume his/her preferred variety of content.
In this way, consumer surplus under both the single-homing and multi-
homing cases is:
CS =
(v + bN1)N1   t
N1R
d1
(x  d1) dx+ (v + bN2)N2   t
1 d2R
N1
((1  x)  d2) dx (4)
Note that only the consumers that do not nd in the media market their
preferred type of content su¤er disutility from t (transportation costs related
with the intensity of consumerspreferences). As such, for media rm 1, the
consumers situated in the interval [0; d1] do not incur in transport costs. And
the same, for media rm 2, the consumers situated in the interval [1  d2; 1]
do not incur in transport costs.
We look now at advertising. We assume that media rms derive all their
revenues from advertising. We decided to abstract from price competition,
since competition amongst content providers in the Internet is nowadays
mostly competition for advertising revenues. In the discussion section of the
paper, we discuss the implications of media rms competing also on prices.
As in Anderson and Coate (2005), and Peitz and Valletti (2008), the demand
for ads for the media rm i is:
ri =   ai, i = 1; 2, (5)
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where ri is the price of advertising per consumer, ai is the advertising
volume, and the parameters  and  represent the size of the advertising
market. Accordingly, a large  and a small  represent a large advertising
market, and vice-versa.
Gross advertising income is then:
Ai = ((  ai) ai)Ni, i = 1; 2, (6)
where Ni is the number of consumers that buy content i. We can then see
that advertising introduces a two-sided market nature to the model. This is
so because, from one side advertisers prefer to buy ads in media rms that
attracts more audience (Ni). From the other side, media rms would like to
increase audience in order to generate more advertising revenue (Ai).
In this way, the prots of media rm i equal:
i = Ai   Ci, i = 1; 2. (7)
Social welfare in both the single-homing and multi-homing cases can then
be written as:
W = 1 +2 + CS. (8)
The timing of the game is the following. In the rst stage, the media
rms choose the diversity of content to o¤er to consumers, di (i = 1; 2). In
the second stage, media rms decide on advertising prices, ai.
In the next sections, we derive the equilibrium of the model. We rst
look to the case where all consumers are single-homing consumers. We then
turn to the case with multi-homing consumers.
3 Single-Homing
To solve the model, we follow the usual strategy with Hotelling models. We
rst nd the indi¤erent consumer. Note that in the model in this paper, we
have two indi¤erent consumers, one for each segment, high and low types.
After, we solve for adverting rates. Then, we solve for the choice of content.
Indi¤erent consumer In what concerns the indi¤erent consumer, note
that in the model in this paper, we have two indi¤erent consumers, one
for each segment, high and low types. In addition, in the single-homing
8
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case, a consumer consumes either from media rm 1 or from media rm
2. Since there are  high types and (1  ) low types, the total number of
consumers for media rm 1 equals N1 = s1 + (1  )n1, while for media
rm 2, the total number of consumers is N2 = s2+(1  )n2. As such, the
indi¤erent consumers in each segment, high and low types, are the ones that
make U1 (s1; bH ; N1) = U2 (s1; bH ; N2) and U1 (s1; bL; N1) = U2 (s1; bL; N2),
respectively. Note also that s2 = (1  s1) and n2 = (1  n1). For the high
types, the indi¤erent consumer equals:
v   t (s1   d1) + bH (s1 + (1  )n1)
= v   t (1  s1   d2) + bH ( (1  s1) + (1  ) (1  n1)) . (9)
While for the low types, the indi¤erent consumer equals:
v   t (n1   d1) + bL (s1 + (1  )n1)
= v   t (1  n1   d2) + bL ( (1  s1) + (1  ) (1  n1)) . (10)
Solving for s1 and n1, we obtain:
s1 =
(bH(1 2(1 )n1) t(1 d2+d1))
2(bH t)
n1 =
(bL(1 2s1) t(1 d2+d1))
2(bL(1 ) t) . (11)
We then have two equations in two unknowns, s1 and n1. Solving simul-
taneously for s1 and n1, we have:
s1 =
(t(1+d1 d2)+(d1 d2)(bH bL)(1 ) SH)
2(t SH)
n1 =
(1+d1 d2)(t (bH bL)) bL
2(t SH) . (12)
Note that SH = (bH + (1  ) bL) is the average value of the network
and information benets parameter b under the single-homing case. To avoid
corner solutions, we assume that the intensity of consumerspreferences is
higher than the average value of the network and information benets, i.e.
t > (bH + (1  ) bL).
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Advertising We turn now to advertising. To nd the advertising rates, we
need to solve for the rst order conditions (FOCs) for advertising, ai = 1; 2.
We can show that the FOCs for advertising equal6:
d1
da1
=
(t(1 d2+d1) SH)( 2a1)
2(t SH)
d2
da2
=
(t(1 d1+d2) SH)( 2a2)
2(t SH) . (13)
Solving simultaneously for a1 and a2, we obtain:
a1 = a2 =

2
. (14)
Next, we turn to the choice of content by media rms.
Content In what concerns the choice of content, we have to solve the FOCs
for content provision, di = 1; 2. We can show that the FOCs for content
provision equal:
d1
dd1
=
(t2 8d1(t SH))
8(t SH)
d2
dd2
=
(t2 8d2(t SH))
8(t SH) . (15)
Solving simultaneously for d1 and d2, we obtain:
d1 = d2 =
2t
8(t SH) . (16)
Since we assume that t > (bH + (1  ) bL), then, media rms provide
positive levels of media content, i.e. d1 = d2 > 0.
Furthermore, the level of content provided by media rms has the follow-
ing relations with the parameters in the model:
6The second order conditions (SOCs) are in appendix. All SOCs are satised.
10
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d(di)
d
= t
4(t SH) > 0
d(di)
d
=   2t
8(t SH)2 < 0
d(di)
dt
=   SH2
8(t SH)2 < 0
d(di)
dbH
= 
2t
8((t SH))2 > 0
d(di)
dbL
= (1 )t
2
8((t SH))2 > 0
d(di)
d
= (bH bL)t
2
8((t SH))2 > 0, with i = 1; 2. (17)
We can see that the provision of content increases with the size of the
advertising market (high  and low ), with the valuation that consumers
give to the network and information e¤ects (high bH and high bL), the number
of high type consumers (high ). In turn, the provision of content decreases
with the intensity of consumerspreferences (high t).
4 Multi-Homing
We now turn to the case where consumers can multi-homing, i.e.: they can
consume from both media rms. We follow Doganoglu and Wright (2006) in
assuming that all high types multi-home and all low types single-home. The
case where only some high types multi-home and the case where some low
types multi-home are not qualitatively di¤erent from the case analyzed in this
section. We can think of the case considered in this section as a benchmark
case, in the sense that increasing the number of consumers that can multi-
home strengths the results in this section in what concerns comparisons with
the single-homing case, and vice-versa. As in the previous section, we start
by nding the indi¤erent consumer, we then turn to advertising rates, and
we then go to the choice of content.
Indi¤erent consumer Since all high types multi-home, we have that si =
1, with i = 1; 2. Therefore N1 =  + (1  )n1 and N2 =  + (1  )n2.
In turn, the share of single-homing consumers that join media rm 1 equals
U1 (n1; bL; N1) = U2 (n1; bL; N2). The indi¤erent consumer is the one that
makes:
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v   t (n1   d1) + bL (+ (1  )n1)
= v   t (1  n1   d2) + bL (+ (1  ) (1  n1)) . (18)
Solving for n1, we obtain:
n1 =
(t(1 d2+d1) MH)
2(t MH) . (19)
Note that MH = (1  ) bL is the average value of the network and
information benets parameter b under the multi-homing case.
For media rm 2, we have that n2 = 1 n1. From n1, it is straightforward
to derive total demand for media rm 1, since N1 = + (1  )n1:
N1 =
(t((1+d2 d1)+(1+d1 d2)))+bL( 1)(+1)
2(t MH) . (20)
Advertising We nd now the advertising rates. As in the previous section,
in order to do this, we need to solve the model for the FOCs for advertising.
The FOCs for a1 and a2 equal7:
d1
da1
= ((t((1+d2 d1)+(1+d1 d2)) bL(1 )(+1)))( 2a1)
2(t bL(1 ))
d2
da2
= (t(1+d2 d1) bL(1 ))( 2a2)(1 )
2(t bL(1 )) . (21)
Solving simultaneously for a1 and a2, we obtain the same advertising
levels as in the single-homing case: a1 = a2 = 12


.
Content We analyze now the choice of content of the two media rms. As
in the previous section, in order to this we look at the FOCs for content.
The FOCs for d1 and d2 equal:
d1
dd1
= 
2t(1 ) 8d1(t bL(1 ))
8(t bL(1 ))
d2
dd2
= 
2t(1 ) 8d2(t bL(1 ))
8(t bL(1 )) . (22)
Solving simultaneously for d1 and d2, we obtain:
7The second order conditions (SOCs) are in appendix. All SOCs are satised.
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d1 = d2 =
(1 )t2
8((t MH)) . (23)
We can then see that d1 = d2 > 0 if t > (1  ) bL. This is always the case
since we assume that t > (bH + (1  ) bL). Then also in the multi-homing
case, media rms always provide positive levels of content.
As in the previous section, we also analyze how the level of content is
a¤ected by the di¤erent parameters in the model. It follows that:
d(di)
d
= (1 )t
4(t MH) > 0
d(di)
d
=   (1 )t2
8(t MH)2 < 0
d(di)
dt
=   (1 )22bL
8(t MH)2 < 0
d(di)
dbL
= (1 )
2t2
8(t MH)2 > 0
d(di)
d
=   2t2
8(t MH)2 < 0, with i = 1; 2. (24)
We can see that, apart from one important exception, content provision
in the multi-homing case behaves in a similar way to the parameters of the
model as in the single-homing case. As in the single-homing case, under the
multi-homing case content provision increases with the size of the advertising
market (high  and low ), and with the valuation that low type consumers
give to the network and information e¤ects (high bL), and decreases with the
intensity of consumerspreferences (high t). In addition, now the valuation
that high type consumers give to the network and information e¤ects (bH)
does not inuence content provision, since all high type consumers multi-
home.
Di¤erently from the single-homing case, however, under the multi-homing
case, content provision decreases with the size of consumers that are of high
type (high ). The reason for this is that multi-homing consumers reduce
competition between media rms, given that they consume from all media
rms and therefore media rms do not have to compete to capture them. As
a result, media rms can o¤er less content, given that lower content will not
reduce demand, and therefore advertising revenues (and prots) will not be
reduced.
Due to this, and comparing the levels of content provision under the
single-homing case and the multi-homing case, we have that:
13
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dSHi   dMHi = (t+(bH bL)(1 ))t
2
8(t SH)(t MH) > 0, (25)
where dSHi and d
MH
i represent the levels of content provision under the
single-homing and the multi-homing cases, respectively. We can see that the
level of content provision is higher under the single-homing case than under
the multi-homing case. The reason is that, as we have said above, multi-
homing consumers, by reducing competition between media rms, reduce
the need for media rms to provide content.
5 Prots, Consumer Surplus and Social Wel-
fare
Single-Homing We can show that prots under the single home case
equal:
SH1 = 
SH
2 =
2
8
  t24
128(t SH)22 , (26)
where SH stands for single-homing.
For consumer surplus, we have:
CSSH =
(4v t+2SH)
4
+ t
22
8(t SH)

1  t2
8(t SH)

. (27)
As such, social welfare under single homing is:
W SH = 
2
4
+
(4v t+2SH)
4
+ t
22
8(t SH)

1  2
8(t SH)

t

+ 1

. (28)
Multi-Homing For the multi-homing case, prots are:
MH1 = 
MH
2 =
(+1)2
8
  4t2(1 )2
128(t MH)22 , (29)
where MH stands for multi homing.
Consumer surplus is:
CSMH = 
2t2(1 )
8(t MH)

1  2t(1 )
8(t MH)

+
((4v (2+1)(t 2)+2bL(1 )(2+1)))
4
.
(30)
As a result, social welfare equals:
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WMH = (+1)
2
4
+
((4v (2+1)(t 2)+2bL(1 )(2+1)))
4
+ 
2t2(1 )
8(t MH)

1  2(1 )
8(t MH)

t

+ 1

. (31)
Single-Homing versus Multi-Homing In terms of prots, consumer
surplus and social welfare, we are interested in comparing the two cases
analyzed in the paper, single-homing and multi-homing. In terms of prots,
we have:
SH MH =  2
8
+ ((1 )(bH+(2 )bL) t(2 ))(t+(1 )(bH bL))t
24
128(t SH)2((t MH))22 < 0. (32)
It can be seen that SH MH < 0. To show this note that the rst term
in equation 32 is always negative. This term captures the e¤ect of the size of
the advertising market, which is more important when  is much larger than
. In what concerns the second term, we have that all terms are positive
with the exception of (bH + bL (2  ))   t (2  ). This term is negative
for t > (1 )(bH+bL(2 ))
(2 ) . Since 
SH   (1 )(bH+bL(2 ))
(2 ) =
bH
(2 ) > 0, the
result above follows.
In this way, we have that prots are always lower under single-homing
than under multi-homing. The reason for this is that with multi-homing com-
petition is softer and rms have higher demand, since a share of consumers
consume from both media rms. This fact contributes positively in two ways
for prots under the multi-homing case relatively to the single-homing case.
First, due to lower competition in the multi-homing case, media rms need to
invest less in content, leading to lower costs. Second, due to higher demand
in the multi-homing case, media rms have higher advertising revenues.
In what relates to consumer surplus, we have:
CSSH   CSMH = ((t 2(1 bL))+2(bH bL 1))
4
+ t
22(t+(1 )(bH bL))
8(t SH)((t MH))

1  2t(t(2 ) (1 )(bH+(2 )bL))
8(t SH)((t MH))

. (33)
Two e¤ects are present when comparing consumer surplus in the single-
homing case and the multi-homing case. First, as we have seen above, media
rms provide more content under single-homing than under multi-homing.
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Second, under multi-homing, network e¤ects can be larger, since some con-
sumers consume from both media rms and therefore they benet from net-
work e¤ects from all consumers in the market. The rst e¤ect contributes to
higher consumer surplus in the single-homing case than in the multi-homing
case. The second e¤ect pushes to higher consumer surplus under the multi-
homing case than under the single homing case. The rst e¤ect tends to be
stronger than the second when the intensity of consumerspreferences (t) is
high in relation to the network e¤ects (bH and bL).
From equations 32 and 33, we can also calculate the di¤erence in social
welfare between the single-homing and multi-homing cases:
W SH  WMH =  2
4
+ ((t 2)+2(bH (1 )bL) 2)
4
+

1  2(t+)(t(2 )+( 1)(bH+(2 )bL))
8(t SH)(t MH)

(t+(1 )(bH bL))t22
8(t SH)(t MH) . (34)
The same forces uncovered above for prots and consumer surplus a¤ect
social welfare under the multi-homing and the single-homing cases. Social
welfare tends to be higher in the multi-content case than in the single-homing
case, when the advertising revenues are high (i.e. the larger  in relation to
), and when the intensity of consumerspreferences (t) is high relatively to
the network e¤ects (bH and bL).
Figure 1 shows the case with a large advertising market ( large in relation
to ). Figure 2 depicts the case with a small advertising market ( small in
relation to ). We can then see that when the advertising market is large,
the multi-homing case tends to do better in all dimensions (prots, consumer
preferences, and social welfare). With the exception of prots, which as we
have seen above are always smaller under the single-homing case relatively to
the multi-homing case, the opposite tends to occur with a small advertising
market.
Figure 3 shows the case where the intensity of consumers preferences
is low relatively to the network e¤ects (small t in relation to bH and bL).
Figure 4 depicts the case where the intensity of consumerspreferences is high
relatively to the network e¤ects (large t in relation to bH and bL). We can
see that when the intensity of consumerspreferences is low relatively to the
network e¤ects, the multi-homing case tends to do better in all dimensions
(prots, consumer preferences, and social welfare). The opposite tends to
occur when the intensity of consumerspreferences is high relatively to the
16
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Figure 1: Prots, Consumer Surplus, Social Welfare: Large Advertising Mar-
ket
g
PSH-PMH
CSSH-CSMH
WSH-WMH
0
1
Figure 2: Prots, Consumer Surplus, Social Welfare: Small Advertising Mar-
ket
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Figure 3: Prots, Consumer Surplus, Social Welfare: Low intensity of con-
sumerspreferences relatively to the network e¤ects
network e¤ects, again with the exception of prots, which are always lower
under the single-homing case relatively to the multi-homing case.
6 Discussion
In this paper, we have analyzed the e¤ects of multi-homing consumers on the
provision of content by media rms. Contrary to single-homing consumers,
which consume from just one media rm, multi-homing consumers consume
from more than one media rm. Multi-homing consumers are ubiquitous, for
instance in the Internet, but large part of the literature on media economics
has focused mostly in single-homing consumers.
From the supply side, we have introduced two central characteristics of
media markets in the Internet. First, competition for advertising revenues.
Second, competition for content. The rst characteristic captures the two-
sided nature of media markets. Advertisers prefer to advertise in media rms
with higher audience, since this allows them to expose their message to more
consumers. As such media rms have strong incentives to increase demand,
in order to increase advertising revenues.
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Figure 4: Prots, Consumer Surplus, Social Welfare: High intensity of con-
sumerspreferences relatively to the network e¤ects
The second characteristic tries to tackle a limitation of many models of
media markets, where is usually assumed that media rms only provide one
type of content. In reality, however, and especially in what concerns the
Internet, most media rms are multi-content. The incentives for media rms
to be multi-content are that this strategy might allow them to capture more
demand (and therefore advertising revenues). A multi-content strategy is in
this sense a way for media rms to cater to diverse consumer preferences.
We show that the level of media content diversity is lower with multi-
homing consumers than with single-homing consumers. The reason for this
is that multi-homing consumers, by consuming from di¤erent media rms,
reduce competition in the media market, since media rms no longer have
to compete to attract these consumers. As a result, media rms have less
need to provide a more diversied content to attract demand, and therefore
advertising revenues. As a result, social welfare tends to be higher under the
multi-homing case relatively to the single-homing case, when the advertising
market is large, and when the network e¤ects are large relative to the intensity
of consumerspreferences.
In this sense, our results raise a series of challenges for media authorities
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and media regulators, since they put a lot of emphasis on the provision
of diversied content by media rms. The media authorities and media
regulators have only instruments to deal with the supply side of the market,
and therefore they can do little to tackle the demand side. The question that
arises is if supply side instruments can deal with demand side forces that
reduce media content. This is in our view an interesting avenue to explore
in the future.
In addition, our results add also to the discussion on rational ignorance.
According to the rational ignorance theory, consumers have very low incen-
tives to search for information because searching is costly, and individually
each consumer can do very little to change the equilibrium of the market or
political outcomes. However, we show that the presence of consumers that
like to be informed (and are therefore willing to search for information and
to consume information from di¤erent sources), can have adverse e¤ects on
the provision of content in media markets. In other words, at same time that
these consumers can reduce the rational ignorance problem since they like
to be informed, they can also aggravate it because less type of content nds
voice in the media market. This is so given that, consumers that like infor-
mation (and therefore consume information from many sources) are captured
by media rms, since media rms do not have to compete for them. As such,
media rms have less need to provide more content to attract demand (and
advertising revenues), which reduces media diversity in media markets.
In this paper, we make two simplifying assumptions. Media rms do
not choose location along the content space (they only choose content level);
and media rms compete only on advertising, but not on prices. We can
think what would happen if media rms also choose location in the content
space and compete in prices. As shown by Gabszewicz et al. (2001, 2002)
when media rms compete in prices and choose location, price competition
is a force for maximum di¤erentiation, while advertising is a force for min-
imum di¤erentiation. However, as demonstrated by Garcia Pires (2014) if
in addition, we also consider multi-content media rms, when minimum dif-
ferentiation ensues (due for instance to a large advertising market), media
rms choose a multi-content strategy. In this way, we can say that introduc-
ing price competition would reduce the incentives of media rms to provide
a multi-content strategy, since they would be less dependent on advertising
revenues. In turn, introducing the choice of location by media rms would
only matter with single-homing consumers, because with multi-homing con-
sumers, competition is, as we have shown, reduced.
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A Appendix
Single-Homing: Second Order Conditions (SOCs). SOCs for adver-
tising:
d21
da21
=   (t(1 d2+d1) (bH+bL(1 )))
(t (bH+bL(1 )))
d22
da22
=   (t(1+d2 d1) (bH+bL(1 )))
(t (bH+bL(1 ))) . (35)
We can see that at the symmetric equilibrium d1 = d2, the SOCs for
advertising are always satised.
SOCs for content:
d21
dd21
= d
22
dd22
=  . (36)
The SOCs for content are then always satised.
Multi-Homing: Second Order Conditions (SOCs). SOCs for adver-
tising:
d21
da21
=   (t((1+d1 d2)+(1+d2 d1)) bL(1 )(1+))
(t bL(1 ))
d22
da22
=   (t(1+d2 d1) bL(1 ))(1 )
(t bL(1 )) . (37)
We can see that at the symmetric equilibrium d1 = d2, the SOCs for
advertising are always satised.
SOCs for content:
d21
dd21
= d
22
dd22
=  . (38)
The SOCs for content are then always satised.
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Content Provision and Multi-Homing
 
Armando J. Garcia Pires
In this paper, we analyze the effects of multi-homing consumers on content 
provision by media firms. We develop a model where media firms compete on 
content provision and advertising revenues, and consumers enjoy network 
effects from consuming content that other consumers also consume. Media 
firms have to choose if they are single-content or multi-content, and in the 
latter case how much content to offer. Competition for advertising revenues 
gives a two-sided market nature to our model, since advertisers prefer media 
firms with more demand. As such, media firms would like to increase demand 
to increase advertising revenues. Offering more content increases demand 
because more consumers can consume their ideal variety without paying 
transport costs. We show that, relatively to the case with single-homing 
consumers, media firms provide less content with multi-homing consumers. 
The reason is that with multi-homing consumers, competition between media 
firms is weakened. Multi-homing consumers consume from all media firms, 
and therefore media firms have lower incentives to provide content to attract 
demand, and advertising revenues. As a result, social welfare tends to be higher 
under the multi-homing case relatively to the single-homing case, when the 
advertising market is large, and when the network effects are large relative to 
the intensity of consumers’ preferences.
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